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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-4681 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAVID MOLESKI, 
                              Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (Crim. Action No. 3-12-cr-00811-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 19, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 20, 2016) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 David Moleski appeals twelve of the nineteen counts of his conviction following a 
jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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prosecution was the result of a fraud scheme that targeted the United States Department 
of the Treasury (“Treasury”), the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), the Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”), the State of New Jersey, private 
creditors, and a credit agency.  We will affirm. 
I. Background1 
 From February 2008 to June 2009, Moleski mailed a number of fake financial 
instruments and letters to the Treasury, the IRS, the TIGTA, and private parties, in an 
attempt to discharge tax and consumer debts.  First, in early 2008, he sent the Treasury 
two bogus documents titled “Private Offset Discharging and Indemnity Bond” and 
“Bonded Registered Bill of Exchange in Accord with HJR-192,” by which he purported 
to open accounts for his personal use.  (J.A. at 791, 796.)  Over the next year, he sent 
through the mail additional fake financial instruments styled as “secured promissory 
notes” to the Treasury, the TIGTA, and several private banks, attempting to draw upon 
the nonexistent Treasury accounts to satisfy his obligations.   Those mailings were 
lengthy, complex, and rife with arcane legal language.  Moleski also sent letters to a 
credit reporting agency, claiming that the instruments he sent to the Treasury and his 
creditors had eliminated his debts.  Based on the foregoing, on January 31, 2013, a 
                                              
1 Moleski only appeals his mail fraud convictions for Counts One through Twelve, 
so we will review only the facts relating to those counts. 
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nineteen-count superseding indictment charged Moleski with, inter alia,2 twelve counts 
of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2.   
At trial, the government’s evidence included the fraudulent documents, as well as 
several witnesses’ testimony about the documents.  The government’s financial 
instruments expert, William Kerr, testified that, even though Moleski “ha[d] no authority 
to obligate the Treasury to open an account for him,” (J.A. at 263), the instruments he 
mailed contained “criteria of ... legitimate financial instrument[s],” (J.A. at 262), and 
were of “high quality” (J.A. at 267.)  He further testified that he “spent some hours going 
over them because they g[a]ve the appearance of being genuine documents ... .”  (J.A. at 
356.) 
The government also presented witnesses to testify about how the recipients of 
Moleski’s mailings would process them.  Juliette Anne Anderson, a former quality and 
compliance manager for Advanta Bank, agreed that, when mailings such as Moleski’s 
arrived at the bank, an employee would “try to determine whether [they] had any value.” 
(J.A. at 228.)  Similarly, Shauna Henline of the IRS Frivolous Return Program testified 
that it was her office’s procedure to review each document received to make sure it was 
“truly frivolous” because even documents with “frivolous rhetoric” sometimes 
“contained a legitimate request.” (J.A. at 549-50.) 
                                              
2 The indictment also charged Moleski with two additional counts of mail fraud, 
one count of wire fraud (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2), one count of “corruptly 
endeavoring to impair and impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code” 
(in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)), and three counts of filing “false, fictitious, and 
fraudulent claims” with the IRS (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 2).  As already 
noted, supra note 1, Moleski does not appeal his conviction on those charges.  
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After the parties rested, the Court properly instructed the jury that, in order to 
convict Moleski of mail fraud, the jury had to find that the government had proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knowingly devised a scheme to defraud or to obtain 
money or property by materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or 
promises; ... that [he] acted with the intent to defraud; and ... that in advancing, 
furthering, or carrying out the scheme, [he] used the mails or caused the mails to be 
used.”  (J.A. at 675.)  The Court went on to instruct the jury that “[t]he false or fraudulent 
representation must relate to a material fact or matter” and, further, that “[a] material fact 
is one which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable and prudent 
person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision” or “one that 
a reasonable person might have considered important in making his or her decision.”  
(J.A. at 677.)  Finally, the Court instructed the jury that “it is not necessary that the 
government prove that ... Moleski actually realized any gain from the scheme or that any 
intended victim actually suffered any loss.”  (J.A. at 678.)  
The jury found Moleski guilty of all nineteen counts, and the Court sentenced him 
to four and a half years’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.  This timely 
appeal followed. 
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II. Discussion3 
On appeal, Moleski challenges his mail fraud convictions on Counts One through 
Twelve, arguing that the government’s evidence of materiality was insufficient for the 
jury to find him guilty.  A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a 
conviction places on the defendant a burden that is “extremely high.”  United States v. 
Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The verdict 
will stand “so long as there is substantial evidence that, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to convict.”  Id. (internal 
quotations marks omitted).  Thus, in a prosecution for mail fraud, we will affirm when 
the government was able to provide substantial evidence at trial that the defendant 
participated in “a scheme or artifice to defraud by means of a materially false or 
fraudulent pretense ... .”  United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 248 (3d Cir. 2011).   
Moleski makes two arguments to challenge the sufficiency of the government’s 
evidence of materiality.  He first contends that “[t]he government presented insufficient 
evidence of ‘materiality’ ..., given that no one was deceived ... by [his] representations ... 
.”  (Opening Br. at 22.)  Proving successful deception, however, is not required to 
demonstrate materiality.  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).  Requiring the 
government to show successful deception “would clearly be inconsistent” with the mail 
fraud statute, because the statute “prohibit[s] the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The parties disagree as to whether plain error 
or plenary review applies to this appeal.  We conclude that the convictions stand under 
either standard, so we will frame our analysis in terms of plenary review. 
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completed fraud ... .”  Id.  Thus, in a fraud prosecution, “it is not a defense that the 
intended victim was too smart to be taken in.”  United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 
333 (7th Cir. 1996).  “To hold otherwise would lead to the illogical result that the legality 
of a defendant’s conduct would depend on his fortuitous choice of a gullible victim.”  
United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1976); cf. United States v. Coyle, 
63 F.3d 1239, 1244 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The negligence of the victim in failing to discover a 
fraudulent scheme is not a defense to criminal conduct.”).   
Second, Moleski argues that the government presented insufficient evidence of 
materiality because, not only was no one actually deceived, “no one ... could have been” 
deceived by his representations.  (Opening Br. at 22.)  Moleski is correct that materiality 
requires a showing that the misrepresentation or omission in question “has a natural 
tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking 
body to which it was addressed.”  Neder, 527 U.S at 16 (internal quotation marks and 
brackets omitted).4  Thus, “[t]here may be attempts so feeble ... that the attempter is 
entitled to be acquitted, as a harmless fool.”  Coffman, 94 F.3d at 333-34.   
Moleski’s scheme, however, was not so feeble that it could not possibly have 
harmed anyone.  Even if the demands in his documents were ultimately baseless, by 
                                              
4 The Neder Court also endorsed the Restatement’s clarification that  
a matter is material if:  
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of 
the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is 
likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of action, 
although a reasonable man would not so regard it.”   
527 U.S. at 22 n.5 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 (1977)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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obscuring them in obtuse legalese he could have confused the busy employees of 
financial institutions and the government who had to review them.  The government 
presented substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could (and apparently did) 
conclude that Moleski’s misrepresentations had the tendency or ability to influence 
decisionmakers at the target organizations to disburse funds, clear debts, recognize debts 
as repaid, or take other action.  The jury had the opportunity to examine Moleski’s 
documents, which were long, complex, and official-looking.  A documents expert 
testified that Moleski’s instruments bore marks of legitimacy and required careful 
examination to understand their worthlessness.  Finally, the jury heard from the 
documents’ recipients, who likewise testified that they had to expend time and energy in 
determining the documents’ validity and what course of action to take with them.  
Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could 
rationally determine that the documents could deceive their recipients.  There was thus 
sufficient evidence of materiality to find Moleski guilty of the mail fraud charges he has 
appealed. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
